Strategic interaction in platform-based markets: An agent-based simulation approach
Huotari, Pontus (2017-08-14)
Väitöskirja
Huotari, Pontus
14.08.2017
Lappeenranta University of Technology
Acta Universitatis Lappeenrantaensis
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-335-104-2
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-335-104-2
Tiivistelmä
Largely enabled by information and Internet technologies, we have recently witnessed
the rise of the platform-based business model, where multiple types of actors are brought
together to interact on a common multi-sided platform. Immensely successful platform
firms such as Apple (e.g., with iOS), Microsoft (e.g., with Windows and Xbox) and
Amazon.com (with the marketplace) continue to inspire strategic management scholars
and economists, who try to uncover the strategies that lead to such abnormal platform
performance and competitiveness. While the extensive focus on the platform has offered
useful implications for platform strategy, the resultant inattention to the inherent external
resource interdependencies between the platform and other platform-based market
participants (i.e., complementors and consumers) has hindered theoretical progress. In
particular, the analytical models of multi-sided platforms, which constitute the theoretical
core of platform literature, tend to assume homogeneity and perfect rationality of the
market participants, and further simplify their strategic interactions, limiting the empirical
validity and normative implications of the platform theory.
Therefore, I explore how micro-level strategic interactions between the platform-based
market participants affect platform performance and competitiveness, and hence platform
strategy. To do so, I use agent-based simulation that enables relaxing the unrealistic
assumptions of analytical models, and thus better highlight how heterogeneous and
bounded rational agents interact in platform-based markets. In addition to the individual
studies that offer a variety of models to capture the complex dynamic interactions, I
develop a further set of novel propositions that together illustrate the general argument
that moderate control over the complex adaptive system (i.e., the platform-based market)
improves platform performance and competitiveness. This is because devolving
complementary resource control to the third parties does not only enable the platform
owner to leverage demand-side economies of scale, as argued in the extant literature, but
devolving resource control may also spur opportunistic complementor and consumer
behavior that may at worst disrupt the platform (e.g., the classic case of Atari). Although
the contribution is largely conceptual, it also builds on empirical evidence in the literature
and that I provide. Finally, I make a minor methodological contribution to the study of
platforms, by illustrating the utility of agent-based simulation in studying these complex
adaptive systems, an endeavor that is the first of its kind.
the rise of the platform-based business model, where multiple types of actors are brought
together to interact on a common multi-sided platform. Immensely successful platform
firms such as Apple (e.g., with iOS), Microsoft (e.g., with Windows and Xbox) and
Amazon.com (with the marketplace) continue to inspire strategic management scholars
and economists, who try to uncover the strategies that lead to such abnormal platform
performance and competitiveness. While the extensive focus on the platform has offered
useful implications for platform strategy, the resultant inattention to the inherent external
resource interdependencies between the platform and other platform-based market
participants (i.e., complementors and consumers) has hindered theoretical progress. In
particular, the analytical models of multi-sided platforms, which constitute the theoretical
core of platform literature, tend to assume homogeneity and perfect rationality of the
market participants, and further simplify their strategic interactions, limiting the empirical
validity and normative implications of the platform theory.
Therefore, I explore how micro-level strategic interactions between the platform-based
market participants affect platform performance and competitiveness, and hence platform
strategy. To do so, I use agent-based simulation that enables relaxing the unrealistic
assumptions of analytical models, and thus better highlight how heterogeneous and
bounded rational agents interact in platform-based markets. In addition to the individual
studies that offer a variety of models to capture the complex dynamic interactions, I
develop a further set of novel propositions that together illustrate the general argument
that moderate control over the complex adaptive system (i.e., the platform-based market)
improves platform performance and competitiveness. This is because devolving
complementary resource control to the third parties does not only enable the platform
owner to leverage demand-side economies of scale, as argued in the extant literature, but
devolving resource control may also spur opportunistic complementor and consumer
behavior that may at worst disrupt the platform (e.g., the classic case of Atari). Although
the contribution is largely conceptual, it also builds on empirical evidence in the literature
and that I provide. Finally, I make a minor methodological contribution to the study of
platforms, by illustrating the utility of agent-based simulation in studying these complex
adaptive systems, an endeavor that is the first of its kind.
Kokoelmat
- Väitöskirjat [1038]