Regulatory oversight of nuclear safety in Finland : Annual report 2016
Kainulainen, Erja (2017-06-16)
Kainulainen, Erja
Säteilyturvakeskus
16.06.2017
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-387-4
STUK-B : 214
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-309-387-4
STUK-B : 214
Kuvaus
1. painos
Tiivistelmä
Management review
In 2016, all Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to their surrounding environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were yet again historically low in almost all of the plant units and radioactive releases into the environment very small. The low employee radiation doses were the result of short annual outages and improvements implemented at the nuclear power plants. In spring 2016, three leaking fuel assemblies were replaced at Olkiluoto 1 during an extra refuelling outage, and then three more assemblies were replaced in connection with the annual outage due to subsequent leaks. The fuel leaks were one reason why the employee radiation doses at the plant unit were somewhat higher than in the previous years.
Over the course of 2016, Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum) submitted to STUK a total of 20 operational event reports. The operational events did not compromise nuclear or radiation safety. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the periodic inspection programme during the annual outage. During the annual outages, Fortum inspected – according to a programme agreed with STUK – that there was no hydrogen flaking in the reactor pressure vessel of the power plant unit 1. Hydrogen flaking could have occurred during manufacture of the pressure vessel. A similar inspection on the pressure vessel of Loviisa 2 was performed in 2014. No hydrogen flaking was detected in either of the pressure vessels. In 2016, STUK focused its regulatory oversight on the Fortum’s organisation, inspecting Fortum’s management, competence, resource and procurement processes. Also in 2016, Fortum completed a major organisational renewal, and STUK oversaw its implementation and initial impact as part of its regulatory oversight.
In 2016, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) submitted to STUK 11 operational event reports. Some radioactive materials were released into the environment in the case of two of the events. One of the events involved fuel leaks and the other an error during maintenance. The set limits were not exceeded and neither of the events compromised radiation safety of the population. Both events increased the radiation level inside the plant, which was taken into account when planning the work to be done by the employees. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the periodic inspection programme during the annual outage. TVO implemented a new organisation and operations model in 2015. Based on inspections by STUK, the new operations model has been largely established, but there are still some challenges pertaining to the atmosphere at the company and the adequacy of resources. STUK will continue to monitor as part of its regulatory oversight the situation and the actions taken by TVO to maintain the organisation’s safety culture during the challenging change.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa, modifications required for improving safety continued. New main steam line safety valves were installed at Loviisa 1 during the 2016 annual outage. They will also operate in a case where water flows through them in addition to steam. A similar installation was carried out at Loviisa 2 in 2014. New main steam line radiation measuring instruments were also installed and commissioned at Loviisa 1. Of the improvement measures started after the Fukushima accident, further improvements of the flood protection and securing the cooling of the fuel pools are still remaining. Their planning proceeded in 2016. An improvement project of the diesel fuel storage and transfer system was completed in 2016. STUK continued its review of the Loviisa I&C renewal documents and supervised installation work of the renewal’s first phase during the 2016 annual outage. The first phase included a preventive safety function control and indication system as well as modernisation of the I&C status monitoring system. The rest of the I&C renewal installations will be completed during the 2017 and 2018 annual outages.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, Olkiluoto will improve, for example, systems used to cool the reactor and add whole new systems for pumping water into the reactor in case of a complete loss of AC power. Another ongoing project at Olkiluoto is an upgrade of the reactor coolant pumps and the emergency diesel generators. In 2016, first of the six reactor coolant pumps in Olkiluoto 1 was replaced. TVO plans to commission the new reactor coolant pumps between 2016 and 2018. STUK continued its review of documents pertaining to the modifications and the supervision of manufacture.
The installation and construction work of Olkiluoto 3 are nearing the end, and full-scale testing of the systems and components was started in 2016. Testing of the I&C systems started at the beginning of the year and the first process system tests were performed in April 2016. TVO submitted an operating licence application for the plant unit to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) in April 2016. At the same time, TVO submitted the documents on the plant and its operation required by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Decree to STUK for approval. In 2016, STUK focused its regulatory oversight on review of the operating licence application and on oversight of the remaining installations and the commissioning activities. While reviewing the operating licence application, STUK also prepared implementation decisions for Olkiluoto 3 of the updated YVL Guides that were published in 2013. The new YVL Guides will enter into force for Olkiluoto 3 as soon as the operating licence is granted.
Due to suspected product forgeries involving manufacturers in France, STUK required reports from the power companies on whether the suspicions involve manufacture of the components used at Olkiluoto 3 or whether any components from the said manufacturers have been used at the operating nuclear power plants. The report on Olkiluoto 3 must be submitted to STUK by the end of April 2017. No forgeries have been detected at the operating plant units, but the reports on Loviisa will be supplemented in early 2017.
In June 2015, Fennovoima submitted to the MEAE a construction licence application for a new nuclear power plant. At the same time, Fennovoima submitted to STUK for review documents required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. Fennovoima has supplemented and will supplement the construction licence application in stages between 2015 and 2018. Delivery of documents has been delayed from the schedule of the first licensing plan due to slower organisation than expected of the project and its supply chain and due to a lack of resources in the design organisation. STUK monitored the development of Fennovoima’s management system and quality management, and assessed the company’s organisational resources to begin construction of a nuclear power plant. In September 2015, STUK launched the inspections included in the regulatory inspection programme, and a total of 15 inspections of Fennovoima and key organisations of the plant supplier were carried out in 2016. Furthermore, STUK’s experts participated as observers in audits of the plant supplier and its subcontractors, arranged by Fennovoima.
The handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and operational waste and the disposal of operational waste were implemented safely, and no events compromising safety were detected at the Loviisa or Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due to the successful planning of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less operational waste than nuclear power plants on average. An important positive development in the waste management of the plants was the fact that operation of a solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste at the Loviisa nuclear power plant started on 15 February 2016 after STUK had approved the related application. Fortum continued the planning of repairs of the damage observed in the outer surface of the concrete vault in the solidified waste disposal facility, which is why the disposal of solidified waste could not be started yet.
The operating licence for the research reactor FiR 1 of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland is valid until the end of 2023. VTT shut down the research reactor for financial reasons in June 2015 and has been preparing decommissioning of the research reactor ever since. STUK has conducted all the measures necessary for the oversight of the reactor that was shut down and prepared for the review of the application on the decommissioning of the reactor. VTT submitted a nuclear waste management plan for the research reactor to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in September 2016. The report described all measures since the 2015 report and all planned measures up until 2022. STUK stated in its statement to the MEAE that VTT had clearly progressed with the planning of the research reactor’s decommissioning over the course of the past year. The most important open issues regarding the decommissioning of the research reactor involve the return of spent fuel to the United States and the storage and disposal of dismantling waste.
After Posiva Oy received a construction licence from the Government on 12 November 2015, STUK’s oversight has focused on the construction of the encapsulation and disposal facility. The regulatory oversight during the construction stage covers design, manufacture, construction and installation of the nuclear waste facility and its safety-classified systems, structures and components. This stage also includes the nuclear waste facility’s commissioning stage, at which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations, review testing programmes and results, and perform commissioning inspections. In 2016, STUK’s oversight focused particularly on the assessment of Posiva’s readiness for construction after the submission of the construction licence. STUK continued to oversee construction of the underground research facility by Posiva, Posiva’s system design, activities of the Posiva organisation and development of Posiva’s safety analyses. An important stage in 2016 was the start of the construction of the disposal facility according to the construction licence. STUK comprehensively assessed Posiva’s readiness for construction before the construction work was started.
In June 2016, Fennovoima submitted to the MEAE its environmental impact assessment programme on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel as required in the 2010 decision-inprinciple. The submission of the EIA programme started Fennovoima’s spent fuel disposal project and the selection process of the disposal facility site. Fennovoima has proposed Sydänneva in Pyhäjoki and Eurajoki as the potential sites. The more exact research area in Eurajoki has not been determined as of yet. In its statement on the EIA programme, STUK emphasised the fact that the proposed process would last a long time, the need to regularly assess the programme to ensure that it is up to date and the fact that the exact research area in Eurajoki must be determined as soon as possible.
In addition to the operation and construction of a nuclear facility, the use of nuclear energy as laid down in section 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act includes the possession, manufacture, production, transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, export and import of nuclear material. Furthermore, components, systems and information required by nuclear facilities are subject to licensing and oversight by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act. In 2016, STUK became aware of two cases of import without the proper licence.
Nuclear safeguards in Finland were implemented in compliance with the international treaties. Nuclear safeguards ensure that nuclear materials and other nuclear items remain in peaceful use in compliance with the relevant licences and declarations and that nuclear facilities and related technologies are only utilised for peaceful purposes. STUK maintains a national control system which aim is to take care of the necessary oversight of use of nuclear energy for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK processed reports and declarations on nuclear materials and performed safeguards inspections together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission. STUK actively promoted with the IAEA and the European Commission the development of nuclear safeguards for the disposal of spent fuel. Key issues in this development work were the development of a new oversight model and a new fuel measuring technology.
In 2016, all Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to their surrounding environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were yet again historically low in almost all of the plant units and radioactive releases into the environment very small. The low employee radiation doses were the result of short annual outages and improvements implemented at the nuclear power plants. In spring 2016, three leaking fuel assemblies were replaced at Olkiluoto 1 during an extra refuelling outage, and then three more assemblies were replaced in connection with the annual outage due to subsequent leaks. The fuel leaks were one reason why the employee radiation doses at the plant unit were somewhat higher than in the previous years.
Over the course of 2016, Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum) submitted to STUK a total of 20 operational event reports. The operational events did not compromise nuclear or radiation safety. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the periodic inspection programme during the annual outage. During the annual outages, Fortum inspected – according to a programme agreed with STUK – that there was no hydrogen flaking in the reactor pressure vessel of the power plant unit 1. Hydrogen flaking could have occurred during manufacture of the pressure vessel. A similar inspection on the pressure vessel of Loviisa 2 was performed in 2014. No hydrogen flaking was detected in either of the pressure vessels. In 2016, STUK focused its regulatory oversight on the Fortum’s organisation, inspecting Fortum’s management, competence, resource and procurement processes. Also in 2016, Fortum completed a major organisational renewal, and STUK oversaw its implementation and initial impact as part of its regulatory oversight.
In 2016, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) submitted to STUK 11 operational event reports. Some radioactive materials were released into the environment in the case of two of the events. One of the events involved fuel leaks and the other an error during maintenance. The set limits were not exceeded and neither of the events compromised radiation safety of the population. Both events increased the radiation level inside the plant, which was taken into account when planning the work to be done by the employees. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the periodic inspection programme during the annual outage. TVO implemented a new organisation and operations model in 2015. Based on inspections by STUK, the new operations model has been largely established, but there are still some challenges pertaining to the atmosphere at the company and the adequacy of resources. STUK will continue to monitor as part of its regulatory oversight the situation and the actions taken by TVO to maintain the organisation’s safety culture during the challenging change.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa, modifications required for improving safety continued. New main steam line safety valves were installed at Loviisa 1 during the 2016 annual outage. They will also operate in a case where water flows through them in addition to steam. A similar installation was carried out at Loviisa 2 in 2014. New main steam line radiation measuring instruments were also installed and commissioned at Loviisa 1. Of the improvement measures started after the Fukushima accident, further improvements of the flood protection and securing the cooling of the fuel pools are still remaining. Their planning proceeded in 2016. An improvement project of the diesel fuel storage and transfer system was completed in 2016. STUK continued its review of the Loviisa I&C renewal documents and supervised installation work of the renewal’s first phase during the 2016 annual outage. The first phase included a preventive safety function control and indication system as well as modernisation of the I&C status monitoring system. The rest of the I&C renewal installations will be completed during the 2017 and 2018 annual outages.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, Olkiluoto will improve, for example, systems used to cool the reactor and add whole new systems for pumping water into the reactor in case of a complete loss of AC power. Another ongoing project at Olkiluoto is an upgrade of the reactor coolant pumps and the emergency diesel generators. In 2016, first of the six reactor coolant pumps in Olkiluoto 1 was replaced. TVO plans to commission the new reactor coolant pumps between 2016 and 2018. STUK continued its review of documents pertaining to the modifications and the supervision of manufacture.
The installation and construction work of Olkiluoto 3 are nearing the end, and full-scale testing of the systems and components was started in 2016. Testing of the I&C systems started at the beginning of the year and the first process system tests were performed in April 2016. TVO submitted an operating licence application for the plant unit to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) in April 2016. At the same time, TVO submitted the documents on the plant and its operation required by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Decree to STUK for approval. In 2016, STUK focused its regulatory oversight on review of the operating licence application and on oversight of the remaining installations and the commissioning activities. While reviewing the operating licence application, STUK also prepared implementation decisions for Olkiluoto 3 of the updated YVL Guides that were published in 2013. The new YVL Guides will enter into force for Olkiluoto 3 as soon as the operating licence is granted.
Due to suspected product forgeries involving manufacturers in France, STUK required reports from the power companies on whether the suspicions involve manufacture of the components used at Olkiluoto 3 or whether any components from the said manufacturers have been used at the operating nuclear power plants. The report on Olkiluoto 3 must be submitted to STUK by the end of April 2017. No forgeries have been detected at the operating plant units, but the reports on Loviisa will be supplemented in early 2017.
In June 2015, Fennovoima submitted to the MEAE a construction licence application for a new nuclear power plant. At the same time, Fennovoima submitted to STUK for review documents required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. Fennovoima has supplemented and will supplement the construction licence application in stages between 2015 and 2018. Delivery of documents has been delayed from the schedule of the first licensing plan due to slower organisation than expected of the project and its supply chain and due to a lack of resources in the design organisation. STUK monitored the development of Fennovoima’s management system and quality management, and assessed the company’s organisational resources to begin construction of a nuclear power plant. In September 2015, STUK launched the inspections included in the regulatory inspection programme, and a total of 15 inspections of Fennovoima and key organisations of the plant supplier were carried out in 2016. Furthermore, STUK’s experts participated as observers in audits of the plant supplier and its subcontractors, arranged by Fennovoima.
The handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and operational waste and the disposal of operational waste were implemented safely, and no events compromising safety were detected at the Loviisa or Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due to the successful planning of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less operational waste than nuclear power plants on average. An important positive development in the waste management of the plants was the fact that operation of a solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste at the Loviisa nuclear power plant started on 15 February 2016 after STUK had approved the related application. Fortum continued the planning of repairs of the damage observed in the outer surface of the concrete vault in the solidified waste disposal facility, which is why the disposal of solidified waste could not be started yet.
The operating licence for the research reactor FiR 1 of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland is valid until the end of 2023. VTT shut down the research reactor for financial reasons in June 2015 and has been preparing decommissioning of the research reactor ever since. STUK has conducted all the measures necessary for the oversight of the reactor that was shut down and prepared for the review of the application on the decommissioning of the reactor. VTT submitted a nuclear waste management plan for the research reactor to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in September 2016. The report described all measures since the 2015 report and all planned measures up until 2022. STUK stated in its statement to the MEAE that VTT had clearly progressed with the planning of the research reactor’s decommissioning over the course of the past year. The most important open issues regarding the decommissioning of the research reactor involve the return of spent fuel to the United States and the storage and disposal of dismantling waste.
After Posiva Oy received a construction licence from the Government on 12 November 2015, STUK’s oversight has focused on the construction of the encapsulation and disposal facility. The regulatory oversight during the construction stage covers design, manufacture, construction and installation of the nuclear waste facility and its safety-classified systems, structures and components. This stage also includes the nuclear waste facility’s commissioning stage, at which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations, review testing programmes and results, and perform commissioning inspections. In 2016, STUK’s oversight focused particularly on the assessment of Posiva’s readiness for construction after the submission of the construction licence. STUK continued to oversee construction of the underground research facility by Posiva, Posiva’s system design, activities of the Posiva organisation and development of Posiva’s safety analyses. An important stage in 2016 was the start of the construction of the disposal facility according to the construction licence. STUK comprehensively assessed Posiva’s readiness for construction before the construction work was started.
In June 2016, Fennovoima submitted to the MEAE its environmental impact assessment programme on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel as required in the 2010 decision-inprinciple. The submission of the EIA programme started Fennovoima’s spent fuel disposal project and the selection process of the disposal facility site. Fennovoima has proposed Sydänneva in Pyhäjoki and Eurajoki as the potential sites. The more exact research area in Eurajoki has not been determined as of yet. In its statement on the EIA programme, STUK emphasised the fact that the proposed process would last a long time, the need to regularly assess the programme to ensure that it is up to date and the fact that the exact research area in Eurajoki must be determined as soon as possible.
In addition to the operation and construction of a nuclear facility, the use of nuclear energy as laid down in section 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act includes the possession, manufacture, production, transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, export and import of nuclear material. Furthermore, components, systems and information required by nuclear facilities are subject to licensing and oversight by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act. In 2016, STUK became aware of two cases of import without the proper licence.
Nuclear safeguards in Finland were implemented in compliance with the international treaties. Nuclear safeguards ensure that nuclear materials and other nuclear items remain in peaceful use in compliance with the relevant licences and declarations and that nuclear facilities and related technologies are only utilised for peaceful purposes. STUK maintains a national control system which aim is to take care of the necessary oversight of use of nuclear energy for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK processed reports and declarations on nuclear materials and performed safeguards inspections together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission. STUK actively promoted with the IAEA and the European Commission the development of nuclear safeguards for the disposal of spent fuel. Key issues in this development work were the development of a new oversight model and a new fuel measuring technology.
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