Public Employees as Politicians: Evidence from Close Elections
Hyytinen, Ari; Meriläinen, Jaakko; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Toivanen, Otto; Tukiainen, Janne (2016-09-27)
Hyytinen, Ari
Meriläinen, Jaakko
Saarimaa, Tuukka
Toivanen, Otto
Tukiainen, Janne
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus VATT
27.09.2016
All rights reserved
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2018042618966
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2018042618966
Tiivistelmä
We analyze the effect of municipal employees' political representation in municipal councils on local public spending. To quantify the effect, we use within-party, as-good-as random variation in close elections in the Finnish open-list proportional election system. One more councilor employed by the public sector increases spending by about one percent. The effect comes largely through the largest party and is specific to the employment sector of the municipal employees. The results are consistent with public employees having an information advantage over other politicians, and thus, being able to influence policy.
Tutkimusteema
Local public economics, Kunnallistalous, Public services, Julkiset palvelut, Effectiveness of public services, Julkisten palvelujen vaikuttavuus
JEL
D720 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, H720 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures, C260 - Econometric Methods: Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation, H750 - State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Avainsanat
Close elections, political representation, public employees, public expenditures
Kokoelmat
- VATT Working Papers [164]