Political cycles of media repression
Schulze, Günther G.; Zakharov, Nikita (31.05.2023)
Numero
3/2023Julkaisija
Bank of Finland
2023
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-323-441-3Tiivistelmä
ABSTRACT
We analyze media repression in Putin’s Russia (2004–2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator’s power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.
We analyze media repression in Putin’s Russia (2004–2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator’s power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.
Julkaisuhuomautus
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
FOCUS
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a new type of autocrat who manipulates information and creates an illusion of competence and effective leadership, unlike traditional autocrats who rely on brute force and repression. This is the essence of Guriev and Treisman’s theory of ‘informational autocrats’ (Guriev and Treisman, 2019, 2020, 2022), yet, the micro politics of media manipulation in informational autocracies are poorly understood. It is the concern
of this paper. We focus on the case of targeted repression against journalists in pre-war Putin’s Russia (2004-2019) and establish the existence of political cycles in media repression peaking around the local elections and their effectiveness in influencing media coverage.
CONTRIBUTION
The research aims to contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence and insights into the dynamics of media repression in informational autocracies. Using a unique granular dataset on city-level incidents of journalist harassment and a staggered and exogenously pre-determined electoral calendar, we find that media repression intensifies in the months preceding local elections, thus establishing political cycles in media repression. Further, we document the disciplining effect of media repression on the journalists‘ community using a unique dataset on the coverage of news mentioning the incumbent.
FINDINGS
The research findings shed light on the cyclical nature of media repression in informational autocracies. The analysis reveals that media repression is significantly more prevalent in the period leading up to local elections, including various forms such as violent harassment, censorship, and detention. However, legal actions against journalists do not show a similar pattern, indicating a preference for repression that does not directly implicate the autocrats. The study also finds that repression is effective: an episode of repression before an election improves the tonality of the news mentioning the incumbent. The two key accountability mechanisms in democracies – (relatively) free elections and (relatively) free press are present in informational dictatorships but rendered ineffective as they are temporally decoupled: While in off-election periods, the media are relatively free, they are disciplined in times of election.
FOCUS
Recent decades have witnessed the emergence of a new type of autocrat who manipulates information and creates an illusion of competence and effective leadership, unlike traditional autocrats who rely on brute force and repression. This is the essence of Guriev and Treisman’s theory of ‘informational autocrats’ (Guriev and Treisman, 2019, 2020, 2022), yet, the micro politics of media manipulation in informational autocracies are poorly understood. It is the concern
of this paper. We focus on the case of targeted repression against journalists in pre-war Putin’s Russia (2004-2019) and establish the existence of political cycles in media repression peaking around the local elections and their effectiveness in influencing media coverage.
CONTRIBUTION
The research aims to contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence and insights into the dynamics of media repression in informational autocracies. Using a unique granular dataset on city-level incidents of journalist harassment and a staggered and exogenously pre-determined electoral calendar, we find that media repression intensifies in the months preceding local elections, thus establishing political cycles in media repression. Further, we document the disciplining effect of media repression on the journalists‘ community using a unique dataset on the coverage of news mentioning the incumbent.
FINDINGS
The research findings shed light on the cyclical nature of media repression in informational autocracies. The analysis reveals that media repression is significantly more prevalent in the period leading up to local elections, including various forms such as violent harassment, censorship, and detention. However, legal actions against journalists do not show a similar pattern, indicating a preference for repression that does not directly implicate the autocrats. The study also finds that repression is effective: an episode of repression before an election improves the tonality of the news mentioning the incumbent. The two key accountability mechanisms in democracies – (relatively) free elections and (relatively) free press are present in informational dictatorships but rendered ineffective as they are temporally decoupled: While in off-election periods, the media are relatively free, they are disciplined in times of election.