Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
Matakos, Konstantinos; Savolainen, Riikka; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tukiainen, Janne; Xefteris, Dimitrios (2018-07-12)
Matakos, Konstantinos
Savolainen, Riikka
Troumpounis, Orestis
Tukiainen, Janne
Xefteris, Dimitrios
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus
12.07.2018
Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-274-222-3
https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-274-222-3
Kuvaus
nonPeerReviewed
Tiivistelmä
We study parties' optimal ideological cohesion across electoral rules, when the following trade-off is present: A more heterogenous set of candidates is electorally appealing (catch-all party), yet, it serves policy-related goals less efficiently. When the rule becomes more disproportional, thus inducing a more favorable seat allocation for the winner, the first effect is amplified, incentivizing parties to be less cohesive. We provide empirical support using a unique data-set that records candidates' ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections. Exploiting an exogenous change of electoral rule disproportionality at different population thresholds, we identify the causal effect of electoral rules on parties' cohesion. This version (March 4, 2019) replaces the July 12, 2018 version.
Tutkimusteema
Local public finance and provision of public services
JEL
C21, C72, D02, D72
Avainsanat
electoral systems, ideological heterogeneity, party cohesion, policymotivated parties, proportional representation, regression discontinuity design
Kokoelmat
- VATT Working Papers [164]